The goal of this paper is to investigate the expression of manner from a cross-linguistic perspective. Our main concern is to provide an analysis of constructions expressing manner in Sfat'imcets (Lillooet Salish) and investigate the consequences of the St'afimcets facts for the analysis of manner constructions in English.
1
Introduction Davidson (1967) has proposed an analysis of locative and temporal modifiers as predicates over an implicit event argument. An example is given in (1):
(1) a.
b.
Mary danced in the kitchen at midnight. 3e [dancing(Mary, e) & in (the kitchen, e)& at (midnight, e)]
Subsequent researchers (a.o. Parsons 1990 , Rothstein 1998 have argued that Davidson's proposal should be extended to manner adverbs such as slowly, dangerously, or sadly. An example of Parson's proposal is given in (2) (the manner adverb is treated as a oneplace predicate over events, and the agent is introduced by means of a thematic-role predicate ): (2) a. b.
Mary danced slowly! sadly in the kitchen at midnight. 3e [dancing(e) & agent (Mary, e) & slow (e)/ sad (e) & in (the kitchen, e) & at (midnight, e)] However, the claim that all manner adverbials are predicates over events is not uncontroversial. Geuder (2000) , for example, has argued that psychological manner adverbials, such as sadly, have readings that involve predication over ordinary individuals instead of events. In this paper we will bring cross-linguistic evidence to bear on this issue.
We will first propose an analysis of manner constructions in St'at'imcets. St'at'imcets is a language that allows locative and temporal modifiers to predicate over events but does not have manner adverbs similar to the English ones. The expression of manner in St' at' imcets is achieved using either subordinate temporal clauses or nominalized constructions. We will propose an analysis of these two strategies couched in the framework of situation semantics [Kratzer 1989 ]. We will also provide an explanation of why St'at'imcets lacks adverbs similar to the English manner adverbs. We will then investigate the generality of an event-based analysis of manner adverbs. In particular, we will be concerned with psychological manner adverbs. We-will show that in St' at'imcets psychological predicates cannot be predicated over events, they can only be predicated over individuals. We will then explore the consequences of this view for the English case.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the relevant St'at'imcets data and empirical generalizations. In Section 3 we present an analysis of St'at'imcets manner constructions, showing the difference between the two St'at'imcets strategies available for expressing manner. In Section 4 we provide an account of why St'at'imcets lacks English-type adverbs. In Section 5 we discuss St'at'imcets data that suggests that psychological predicates are not able to predicate over events, and discuss possible consequences for the analysis of English psychological adverbials.
2
The expression of manner in St' at'imcets St'at'imcets (Lillooet) is a Northern Interior Salish language spoken in the interior of British Columbia, Canada. It is endangered. All data presented here comes from primary field work.
2.1
The absence of manner adverbs St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs. By this we do not mean simply that St'at'imcets lacks a class of manner adverbs that are morphologically distinct from adjectives. Many languages may fail to overtly distinguish adverbs from adjectives but still use adjectives in what we would classify as an adverbial construction. A German example is given below: (3) In this section we have shown that St' at' imcets has no way of expressing manner by means of a single lexical item inside a VP. In the next section we will discuss the strategies that are available in St'at'imcets.
2.2
Two strategies for the expression of manner The main clause in (6g) asserts that Mary was dangerous at some past time, and the subordinate temporal clause restricts that time to a driving time. Similarly, the main clause in (6d) asserts that I was fast at some past time, and the subordinate clause restricts that time to a time at which I was running. The examples in (6) have temporal clauses headed by either the complementizer i or the complementizer Ih. The presence of i restricts the temporal location of the events picked out by the subordinate clause to past times.lh is not restricted to past times. For reasons of space, we will limit our attention in this paper to examples with i.
The second strategy available for expressing manner in St'at'imcets involves the nominalization of a clause. A nominalized clause is headed by a determiner ti-a, and the clause sister to the determiner is headed by a nominalizer S-. The clause sister to s-is a fully inflected clause. Examples of this construction are given below: In (7c), k'fnk'ent (dangerous) is predicated of a nominalized clause headed by a determiner ti-a. Similarly, in (7a) skenkfn (slow) is predicated of a nominalized clause headed by ti-a. Two things are worth pointing out at this point, since we will return to them later. One is that the predicates that we find in (7) can also predicate over ordinary individuals:
Mary was dangerous
The other is that the determiners that head the nominalized clauses are not specific to this construction. They are ordinary determiners that can combine with noun predicates: (9) xwes-xwfs-ana7 ti smulhats-a smile(REDuP}-ear DET woman-DET The woman smiled Ideally, an analysis of (7) should not require making special stipulations about either the predicates or determiners when they appear in this construction. This will be one of the goals of our analysis.
The examples in (10) are presented to show that predication over nominalized clauses does not involve predication over the ordinary individuals that participate in the events: (10) The sentence in (lOa) does not assert that Philomena was strong, only that her punching was strong. Similarly, (lOb) does not claim that Philomena was easy, only that she climbed easily.
3
Analysis of the St'at'imcets manner construction
In this section we will present an analysis of the two constructions employed to express manner in St'at'imcets.
Preliminary assumptions
Our analysis of St'at'imcets manner constructions is formulated within the framework of Kratzer's situation semantics. That framework allows us to explain the relation between the interpretation of simple clauses and the interpretation of nominalized clauses in a simple and straightforward manner. Our analysis of nominalized clauses is partly inspired by Zucchi's (1993) proposal for the semantics of nomina Ii zed clauses in English, which is also stated within a situation semantics framework.
Kratzer 1989 proposes a semantic analysis of counterfactual conditionals based on situations. In this paper we will adopt her basic assumptions about that framework.
Kratzer distinguishes between two kinds of possible individuals: ordinary individuals and situations. The members of both sets of individuals are partially ordered with respect to each other by means of a part-of relation. The intuition behind the part-of relation between situations is that a situation bears the relation to any other situation that, in an intuitive sense, contains it. Some situations are considered maximal: they are not proper parts of any other situation. Entities that are maximal with respect to the part-of relation correspond to what is traditionally thought of as possible worlds. The set of possible worlds therefore, is a subset of the set of possible situations.
In giving a semantic analysis in terms of situations, we will make use of the elements below: (11) a set of possible situations S (corresponding to the semantic type s) a set of possible individuals I (corresponding to the semantic type e) a partial ordering on the set of situations and individuals < the set of maximal elements with respect to the ordering relation, or the set of possible worlds Sentences will be taken to denote propositions. In the framework developed by Kratzer, propositions are sets of possible situations. So in addition to the elements in (11), we will make use of the power set of S (the set of propositions).
The proposal presented here diverges both from Kratzer's analysis of counterfactuals and from Zucchi's analysis of nominalizations in that, in addition to situations, we will make use of events. We will take events to be a subset of the set of individuals (i.e. a subset of I). We will assume that an event takes place inasituation.iff it is part of that situation. An example is given in (12): (12) drive (e)(Mary)(s) = 1 iff e is an event of Mary driving and e<s Our proposal differs from proposals in the literature that try to reconstruct the notion of event in terms of a primitive notion of situation (e.g. events as minimal situations with certain properties). We will not take a position in the debate as to how events should be defined in terms of situations. As has often been noted, it is notoriously difficult to spell out the individuation conditions on events, and we will set aside this problem here. We will simply treat events as a kind of individual. Further work could allow for a refinement of this proposal.
In dealing with the semantics of St' at' imcets nominalized clauses it will be necessary to spell out the semantics of aspect and tense. To do so we will appeal to a function 't mapping events to their running times. So, in addition to the set of situations and the set of individuals, we will include as an ingredient in our semantics the set of times T (corresponding to the semantic type i). Depending on the view adopted with respect to the nature of time, the members of T will or will not be definable in terms of situations or events. We will remain neutral on this point.
Following Partee 1973 and Kratzer 1998, we will adopt a referential analysis of tense. Tenses are taken to be referential expressions, similar to pronouns. They refer to individuals in the domain of times (T) . Following Kratzer 1998, we will assume that VPs denote properties of events, and that aspectual heads map properties of events onto properties of times. Tenses c-command aspectual heads and saturate the time argument corresponding to properties of times, mapping properties of times onto propositions.
St'at'imcets has overt tense and aspectual morphology, but such morphology is . optional. We will assume that phonologically null tense and aspectual heads are present in the sentence in cases in which tense and aspect are not overtly indicated. We will also assume that the default value for aspect is perfective. Evidence supporting such a claim comes from aspectual restrictions on present tense interpretations. In St' at' imcets, as in English, stative eventualities can receive an 'ongoing event' interpretation in the present tense, but other types of eventualities cannot. 2 Benett and Partee 1978 have argued, with respect to English, that such aspectual restrictions are due to the fact that only stative eventualities (i.e. homogeneous eventualities) can 'fit' within the instantaneous speech time. We will incorporate this insight into our analysis by proposing that the default aspectual operator is perfective: a perfective operator requires that the running time of the eventuality be included within the temporal interval denoted by tense.
We will adopt the analysis of aspect and tense presented in Kratzer 1998. According to that proposal, aspectual heads map properties of events onto properties of times (the interpretation of perfective aspect is given in (13a». Tenses come in two varieties: deictic and variable tenses (the interpretation of the deictic tenses in St' at' imcets is given in (13b-d), while the interpretation of a phonologically null variable tense is given in (13e». Variable tenses differ crucially from deictic tenses in that variable tenses can be bound and deictic tenses cannot. The prediction is that only variable tenses can appear in clauses that denote properties of times. The reader is referred to Kratzer 1998 for discussion and motivation of this proposal. (13) a.
- e.
Given the assumptions spelled out so far, the LF and interpretation of a simple tensed clause (14a) would be as in (14b) We will propose an analysis according to which i binds a temporal variable introduced by tense in the subordinate clause (this analysis predicts that tenses in iclauses are always variable tenses). As we have mentioned before, the complementizer i indicates that the subordinate clause denotes a property predicated of past.times. This restriction to past times will be captured as a presupposition introduced by i. The interpretation of i is given below:
Given this proposal, the LF and interpretation of a sentence like (15) will be as in (17) The i-clause is interpreted by intersection with the main clause (see Heim and Kratzer's 1998 'Predicate Modification Rule) . The result is a property of times that contain both events of Mary driving and events of Mary being dangerous. The tense pronoun in TP saturates the temporal argument of this property, resulting in a proposition that corresponds to the set of situations that contain both past events of Mary driving and past events of Mary being dangerous. The temporal location of such events is restricted to some contextually salient past time.
According to the analysis proposed above t it is Mary who is asserted to be dangerous~ not her driving. Driving in a dangerous manner is certainly one of the ways in which Mary could be dangerous while driving, but it is not the only one. It could be the case that Mary was driving quite cautiously, but was dangerous while driving due to some completely independent factor, e.g. Mary likes to shoot out of the window while she is driving, and sometimes she hits animals or people. The sentence in (15) could be truthfully uttered in such circumstances, as our analysis predicts.
3.3 N ominalized clauses 3.3.1 The internal structure of nominalized clauses
As we have seen in Section 2.2, the second strategy available in S1' at' imcets to express manner is the use of nominalized clauses. Example (7c) is repeated below: As in the case of simple clauses, we will assume that tense and aspect heads are present even in the absence of overt morphology.
The nominalized clause in examples like (18) will be assigned the internal structure in (20) (20), for example, denotes the proposition specified in (21):
Part of the challenge of giving an analysis of St'at'imcets nominalized clauses consists in explaining how the meaning of the proposition denoted by the TP contributes to the overall interpretation. We will address this and related issues in the next section.
Minimal situations in nominalized clauses
An adequate analysis of St'at'imcets nominalized clauses should explain how the meaning of the entire construction is compositionally derived. This includes accounting both for the meaning contribution of the embedded TP, and for the meaning contribution of the ti-a determiner that heads the nominalized clause. As we have seen in (9) [repeated below], the determiners that head nominalized clause are ordinary determiners that appear in DPs in combination with noun predicates:
(22) xwes-xwfs-ana7 ti smulhats-a smile(REDup)-ear DET woman-DET The woman smiled One goal of our analysis is to arrive at a uniform treatment of determiners that can account for their interpretation in both constructions.
Matthewson 1999 has investigated the semantics of determiners in combination with noun predicates. She has argued that ti-a determiners in St'at'imcets introduce a variable over choice functions, picking out an individual from the set corresponding to the predicate denoted by the noun [the reader is referred to Matthewson for details and discussion]. The determiner in (22), for example, denotes a contextually salient function that picks out one woman from the set of women, and the sentence then asserts that that woman smiled. Ignoring tense and aspect, a simplified representation of the meaning of (22) is given below: (23) smiled (f(woman» We will adopt Matthewson's choice-function analysis of determiners and extend it to the cases in which determiners appear in nominalized clauses. To do that we need to explain what is the set that the choice function is operating on in nominalized constructions. Inspired by Zucchi 1993, we would like to propose that nominalized clauses denote minimal situations. We will argue that the choice function determiner ti-a picks out a minimal situation from a set of minimal situations that is the denotation of the clause sister to the determiner, the clause headed by the nominalizer S-. We have proposed that the TP in (20) denotes a proposition: the set of situations that include an event of Mary driving with a running time included in some contextually salient past time (more specifically, the characteristic function of that set). The set corresponding to the proposition contains all situations that include such a driving event, both minimal and non-minimal (it will, for example, include the maximal situations that contain such an event, entire worlds). Clearly the choice function determiner does not operate on such a set (it cannot pick out an entire world). It operates on the subset of that set made up of minimal situations. We propose that the nominalizer s-is responsible for trimming away the non-minimal situations in the TP. s-combines with a proposition and the result is the subset of minimal situations within that proposition. The interpretation we propose for s-is given below: [Heim 1990 , von Fintel 1994 Given this semantics for S-, the denotation of the clause sister to the determiner in (20) will be as in (25) (24), minimal situations that contain a driving event by Mary will have no proper subparts that also contain that event. They have rio parts that are irrelevant to the event. In fact, the minimal situations that contain such events will turn out to be extensionally indistinguishable from the events themselves. When we talk about a minimal situation containing an event we are, in a sense, referring to one individual twice, once under the guise of an event, and once as a situation. Given this view of situations and events, a property of minimal situations turns out to be extensionally equivalent to a property of events.
Under the analysis proposed above, the clause headed by s-and the VP in (20) both pick out a set of events in a world. They do not, however, pick out the same set. The VP picks out all the driving events. The clause headed by s-picks out a subset of the driving events: it picks out those driving events that are events of driving by Mary that have a running time that is included in the contextually salient past time.
Since the choice function determiner combines with a clause that denotes a set of minimal situations that contain an event of the relevant kind, it will, in fact, pick out one of those events. The denotation of the nominalized clause will then be a contextually salient event (i.e. an event selected by a contextually salient choice function). In an example like (18) the nominalized clause picks out a contextually salient event/minimal situation of Mary driving, and the sentence then asserts that that event was dangerous.
Matthewson notes that the choice function determiner ti-a carries existence entailments: DPs headed by ti-a refer to individuals that actually exist [Matthewson 1998 [Matthewson , 1999 . There is a parallel in the domain of nominalized clauses, as nominalized clauses are factive and are taken to refer to events that have actually taken place. This could be captured if it were the case that the choice-function determiner can only pick out an actual-world minimal situation. Working out such restrictions, however, remains a matter for future research. [cf. Zucchi, who also argues that nominalized clauses (in English) presuppose that an event of the relevant kind has occurred].
Predicating over events
According to the analysis spelled out above, clauses headed by the nominalizer sdenote (the characteristic function of) sets of situations that are also events. This means that such clauses are ambiguous as to their semantic type. Viewed as sets of situations, they would be classified as of type <s, t>. Viewed as sets of events, they would be classified as of type <e, t> (recall that events are a subset of the set of individuals). That is, clauses headed by s-can be characterized as denoting properties of individuals.
According to Matthewson, choice function determiners map such properties onto a contextually salient individual. The result is that a nominalized clause denotes an indi vidual (type e).
Given their semantic type, nominalized clauses can combine with predicates of individuals. We suggest that that is indeed what happens in examples like (18) . The predicate k'ink'ent (dangerous) can be predicated of ordinary individuals (as in (8) It is possible to capture the interpretation of k'ink'ent (dangerous) in both cases treating it as a predicate of individuals. In sentences like (27) it combines with a nominalized clause. The LF of (27) will be as in (28a), and its interpretation as in (28b): (28) a.
[det nom-0past 0perfective touch-string-intr-3sg.poss-det nom-Mary] b.
Summary
In this section we have given an analysis of the semantics of St' at'imcets nominalized constructions. We have argued that in this construction a choice function determiner picks out a minimal situation from a set. Since such a situation will be extensionally equivalent to an event, nominalized clauses can be taken to denote contextually salient events. In the framework we have adopted, events are a kind of individual. Predicates that can predicate over individuals will also (sometimes) be able to predicate over events, and in this way a manner interpretation will be achieved.
4
Why St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs
Having provided an analysis of the St'at'imcets manner constructions, we now tum to the question of why St' at' imcets lacks constructions like the English manner adverb construction. As we discussed in Section 1, many researchers assume that the English construction involves predication over an event argument. An example is given below:
(29) a. Mary drove slowly/ dangerously! sadly. b.
3e [driving (e) & agent (Mary, e) & slow (e)/ dangerous (e)! sad (e)]
It could be thought that the reason that Sf at' imcets lacks logical forms like (29b) is that it lacks an event argument altogether. We will show in the next section that such an explanation would be wrong and that there is evidence that St' at' imcets does have an event argument. 
a.
Mary danced in the bathroom.
b. Given that the entailment facts are the same in St'at'imcets as in English, equal support for an event-based analysis of locative and temporal modifiers is to be found in both languages. Such an analysis is illustrated below for St'at'imcets, where (34) is the LF of (30a):
As The data presented in this section suggests that the evidence for an implicit event argument is as good in St' at' imcets as in English. In principle nothing rules out predication over an implicit event argument in St'at'imcets. The difference between St' at' imcets and English with respect to manner adverb constructions must come from another source.
4.2
The solution
We propose that St'at'imcets lacks manner adverbs because it lacks lexical items with the right argument-structure properties. Following Matthewson and Davis (1995) , Davis (2000) we claim that St' at' imcets possesses only a two-way distinction in lexical categories: nouns vs. everything else. The difference is that while nouns may appear in the syntax as bare predicates, without projecting to tense, non-nouns necessarily project clausal structure. 4 Given the claim above, it follows that a predicate like skenkfn (dangerous) will always appear with its own tense and external argument. It is impossible for a lexical item of this type to predicate directly over the event argument: a type mismatch would ensue. This is illustrated below: There is a type mismatch at the VP 1 node: VP 2 is a property of events and TP 2 is a proposition.
The explanation given here of the ungrammaticality of (35a) is similar to the explanation that would be given of the ungrammaticality of (36): (36) a. b.
*Mary drove was dangerous. *Mary drove scared me.
In English, two verbs cannot predicate over the same event because each verb must have its own functional structure (i.e. they must project to Tense). The difference between St'at'imcets and English is that English has a separate category of Adjective which do not have to project to Tense.
The claim that the inability of verbs in English to function as adverbs is due to a tense requirement is found also in observations made by Rothstein [1983: 148] The proposal made here also bears some similarity to claims made by Baker (in prep.) . In his discussion of the defining properties of adjectives and verbs, Baker argues that only verbs have the power to take a specifier, which is normally thetamarked as a theme or agent... The distinctive property of a verb is that it has a theta role to discharge; if that theta role is not properly assigned, the structure will be ruled out by the (ordinary) theta criterion While there are many differences in detail between Baker's analysis and ours, it seems that there is a common prediction to both: in a language which lacks a category of adjectives separate to verbs, adverbs will also be absent.
4.3
A consequence for locative and temporal modifiers
The analysis presented above makes a prediction about locative and temporal modifiers in St' at' imcets. In Section 4.1 we have analyzed such modifiers as event predicates inside the VP. Given our discussion in Section 4.2, the prediction is that such modifiers need not project Tense (otherwise they too would lead to a type mismatch Summarizing the results of Section 4, we have argued that only lexical items that need not project their own clausal structure can be added as predicates of events within the VP. The absence of manner adverbs in St' at' imcets is due to the restricted categorial system of the language.
Psychological adverbs
As was mentioned in Section 1, objections have been raised to the claim that all manner adverbs are predicates over events. Geuder 2000, for example~ has argued that psychological manner adverbs predicate over ordinary individuals in some interpretations. In this section we will discuss data from St'at'imcets that suggests that psychological manner adverbs actually never predicate over events and then discuss the consequences of adopting this view for English. We claim that in St'at'imcets psychological state predicates are always predicated over ordinary individuals, and never over events. We will briefly investigate the consequences of a similar hypothesis for English in the next section.
Subject depictives and psychological adverbs in English
The contrast exemplified in (44) appears to be problematic for the claim that in English too psychological predicates only predicate over ordinary individuals, and never predicate over events: (44) a.
h.
John left the room sad. John left the room sadly.
A fully generalized event-predicate of adverbs can capture the difference between (44a) and (44b) by claiming that the adverb, and not the depictive, predicates over the event argument: (45) a. The availability of logical fonns like (45b) in English makes it totally mysterious why psychological predicates cannot predicate over events in St'at'imcets. We would like to suggest that (45) may not be the correct analysis of the contrast in (44). Instead, we would like to differentiate between sad and sadly in tenus of evidentiality. We claim that both sad and sadly predicate over ordinary individuals. The difference is that sad asserts that an individual is actually sad, while sadly only asserts that an individual appears to be sad. A proposal along these lines would capture the contrast in (44), and would also be able to explain why examples like (46) are felicitous (and not contradictory):
(46) a.
b. c.
John walked sadly off the stage, but he wasn't sad. Although Jan drove the car drunkenly, she wasn't drunk. Although Jan drove the car drunk, she didn't drive drunkenly.
[(46b) and (46c) are from Dechaine 1993] One obvious question raised by this proposal is how the evidential meaning we have assigned to -ly can be reconciled with the other non-evidential uses of this suffix. Some examples are given in (47): (47) a.
Fortunately/ happily/luckily, it didn't rain. Frankly! honestly, I don't give a damn.
Conclusion
St' at' imcets is a language that lacks manner adverbs similar to the English ones. Two constructions are available to express manner: subordinate temporal clauses and nominalized clauses. In this paper we have proposed an analysis of these constructions, as well as an explanation of why S1' at'imcets lacks English-type adverbs.
Many researchers working within neo-Davidsonian frameworks have proposed to analyze manner adverbs as predicates over events. However, the generality of this treatment has been questioned. It has been suggested (e.g. Geuder 2000) that psychological adverbs do not necessarily predicate over events. We have argued that in S1' at' imcets psychological predicates never predicate over events. And we have suggested that this view could be adopted for English too.
